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Abstract
The paper analyses the emergence of group-specific attitudes and beliefs about tax com-
pliance when individuals interact in a social network. It develops a model in which tax-
payers possess a range of individual characteristics — including attitude to risk, potential
for success in self-employment, and the weight attached to the social custom for honesty
— and make an occupational choice based on these characteristics. Occupations differ in
the possibility for evading tax. The social network determines which taxpayers are linked,
and information about auditing and compliance is transmitted at meetings between linked
taxpayers. Using agent-based simulations, the analysis demonstrates how attitudes and
beliefs endogenously emerge that differ across sub-groups of the population. Compliance
behaviour is different across occupational groups, and this is reinforced by the development
of group-specific attitudes and beliefs. Taxpayers self-select into occupations according to
the degree of risk aversion, the subjective probability of audit is sustained above the objec-
tive probability, and the weight attached to the social custom differs across occupations.
These factors combine to lead to compliance levels that differ across occupations.
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1 Introduction
Tax evasion is the illegal concealment of a taxable activity. Measuring how
much economic activity is concealed will always be difficult since those who
engage in evasion have every motivation to hide their activities. Even so,
the estimates that are available from official sources (such as H. M. Revenue
and Customs, 2010) and from academic researchers (Schneider and Enste,
2000) are in agreement that evasion is an economically significant activity.
This emphasizes the importance of understanding the decision process of a
taxpayer when choosing whether to comply with tax law or to engage in
evasion. A good theory of the compliance decision is essential for designing
an audit policy that deters evasion.
The initial analysis of the compliance decision by Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) models the taxpayer as facing a decision under risk, with the extent
of evasion chosen to maximise expected utility. The model provides precise
comparative statics predictions, but these are not always in accord with data
(Clotfelter, 1983; Crane & Nourzad, 1986) or intuition. In particular, when
evaluated using levels of the audit probability and the fine rate close to those
observed in practice, the model predicts that all taxpayers should engage in
evasion. This has motivated numerous extensions of the standard model —
surveyed by Pyle (1991) and Sandmo (2005) — but these extensions do not
address its fundamental limitations.
Two sets of issues have to be addressed in constructing an improved
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model. First, behavioural economics has demonstrated that individuals gen-
erally do not evaluate risky prospects using the objective probabilities of
events. In practice, decisions are made using subjective probabilities that
can differ significantly from the objective probabilities (Kahneman & Tver-
sky, 1979). Contributions drawing on these ideas are made by al-Nowaihi and
Dhami (2007), Arcand and Graziosi (2005), and Snow and Warren (2005).
Second, there is now compelling empirical (Spicer & Lundstedt, 1976) and
experimental (Baldry, 1986) evidence that the tax evasion decision is not
simply an individualistic gamble. Instead, a wide range of social and psy-
chological factors enter the compliance decision. Gordon (1989) analyses a
psychic cost of evasion, Myles and Naylor (1996) introduce a social custom
into compliance, and the concept of tax morale (Torgler, 2002) subsumes a
range of social and equity factors. For reasonable parameter values these
recent models can predict the levels of evasion that are consistent with em-
pirical data.
An issue that has not been given much attention is the processes through
which attitudes towards compliance are formed. Attitudes and beliefs are
not exogenous but must result from interaction with other taxpayers and
with the tax authority. The appropriate method for modelling such inter-
action is a social network that allows endogenous evolution of attitudes and
beliefs. Placing appropriate structure on the social network can also permit
investigation of how the degree of separation determines the divergence of
attitudes and beliefs that can emerge among distinctive social groups in a
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heterogeneous society.
Attitudes and beliefs are not only important for how a taxpayer will act
when confronted with an evasion opportunity: they are equally important in
determining whether a taxpayer has such an opportunity in the first place.
This is because opportunities for evasion are very limited in most forms of em-
ployment. The deduction of income tax at source and third-party reporting
make evasion of employment income very difficult, if not impossible. In con-
trast, income earned in self-employment (or entrepreneurship) is not taxed
at source and can have limited third-party reporting. This makes it possible
to undertake evasion when in self-employment. When an individual makes
a choice of occupation the possibility of evasion in self-employment must be
taken into account, which makes occupational choice partly dependent on
the perceived benefit of evasion.
This paper seeks to combine these ideas and to explore the endogenous
emergence of group-specific attitudes and beliefs. We embed a behavioural
model of the evasion decision into a social network, through which infor-
mation on the activities of the revenue service is transmitted. Individual
taxpayers are heterogenous in several dimensions, such as skill in employ-
ment, attitude to risk, and success in self-employment. We also include a
choice between occupations that differ in the riskiness of reward and the op-
portunity to engage in evasion. The model is analysed by simulation, which
permits us to trace the tax evasion dynamics that emerge from repeated
taxpayer interaction within the network. The endogenous separation of tax-
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payers into occupations with differing evasion opportunities creates different
behavioural types who comply to different degrees and can develop differing
attitudes and beliefs.
The central result that emerges from the analysis is that risk aversion,
occupational choice, compliance, and attitude to evasion are inter-related
and mutually reinforcing. The true probability of audit is unknown, so tax-
payers learn a subjective probability through information transmission via
social interaction. The simulations show, first, that interaction can sustain a
subjective probability of audit that exceeds the objective probability. Thus,
the model provides an illustration of how beliefs can be formed in subjec-
tive expected utility theory. Second, they demonstrate how taxpayers self-
select into occupations in a way that maximises the amount of tax evasion.
Self-employment is risky, so it is chosen by those with lower degrees of risk
aversion. But it also opens the opportunity to evade, and those with a low
risk aversion will evade the most when given the opportunity. Hence, we see
a process of self-selection of those who will evade the most into a situation
where they can evade. The self-selection is reflected in the levels of com-
pliance of the different occupational groups: compliance in the most risky
occupation is lowest. The endogenous choice of occupation results in different
groups having markedly different rates of compliance. The attitude toward
compliance also differs across the occupational groups. The information ex-
change between people in the same occupation reinforces groups beliefs, and
sustains different social customs across groups. Taxpayers in the riskier oc-
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cupation comply less, and this is mutually reinforcing with a lower value of
the social custom. In this sense the network can permit group-specific social
attitudes to develop.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the separate com-
ponents that are built into the model. Section 3 provides analytical details on
how these components are implemented. Section 4 describes the simulation
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modelling
This section describes the separate elements that constitute the model. The
intention is to place them into the context of the literature.
2.1 Subjective beliefs
The analysis of the evasion decision by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) applied
expected utility theory. The standard interpretation is that the expectation
is taken using the objective probability of an audit. One criticism of the
model is that it over-predicts the extent of evasion when evaluated using the
objective probability. This has motivated the application of different forms
of non-expected utility theory to the evasion decision. These are surveyed in
Hashimzade, Myles, and Tran-Nam (2012).
The situation is referred to as one of risk when the decision maker knows
the probabilities of events. However, these probabilities can be distorted
into “decisions weights” to form the expected payoff. Rank dependent ex-
5
pected utility (Quiggin, 1981, 1982; Quiggin & Wakker, 1994) uses a par-
ticular weighting scheme to transform the objective probability of events
into subjective probabilities and has been applied to the evasion decision by
Arcand and Graziosi (2005), Bernasconi (1998) and Eide (2001). Prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) also uses
a weighting scheme but payoffs are determined by gains and losses relative to
a reference point. Applications to compliance include al-Nowaihi and Dhami
(2007), Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004), Rablen (2010), and Yaniv (1999).
Uncertainty occurs when the decision maker does not know the probabil-
ities. It has been modelled by assuming the decision maker forms a proba-
bility distribution over possible probabilities of outcomes. This gives rise to
the concept of “ambiguity” which has been surveyed in Camerer and Weber
(1992) and applied by Snow and Warren (2005).
Non-expected utility model can predict the correct level of evasion for
reasonable parameter values. This is because they permit the subjective
probability of audit (the weighting on the payoff when audited) to be greater
than the objective probability. They also open the possibility of designing
compliance policy to manipulate the subjective nature of the decision (Elffers
& Hessing, 1997). We incorporate these ideas into the analysis by assuming
the probability of audit is subjective, and by providing an explicit process
through which the subjective belief is formed. The model therefore provides
an endogenous explanation of subjective probabilities that are systematically
different from the objective probabilities.
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2.2 Social customs
The experiments of Baldry (1986) suggest that the evasion decision is sys-
tematically different from a straightforward gamble. One explanation for
this finding is that choosing to evade results in costs being incurred. For
instance, Bayer (2006) assumes that concealing income has a direct finan-
cial cost. A related interpretation is provided by Lee (2001), who assumes a
taxpayer can reduce the assessed income after audit by paying an additional
cost (such as a reduction in return from using concealed investments or the
cost of professional advice for securing income in non-taxable forms).
A different approach is to view these costs as psychic, rather than finan-
cial. Such psychic costs might arise through the fear of detection, or the
shame of being exposed. Their magnitude may, therefore, reflect an indi-
vidual’s underlying attitudes towards compliance — an important feature of
psychological theories of tax evasion (e.g., Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008;
Weigel, Hessing, & Elffers, 1987). Gordon (1989) formally incorporates psy-
chic costs into the evasion decision. He interprets such psychic costs as arising
from the social setting in which the taxpayer operates, so are a result of the
loss of social prestige or reputation. An alternative to the psychic cost is
the “conscience parameter” of Eisenhauer (2006, 2008). In this formulation
of the compliance decision an individual recognises that evading tax results
in free-riding on the taxes paid by compliant taxpayers. This generates a
sense of guilt for the tax evader. The guilt is represented by discounting the
untaxed income by the moral equivalent of a tax rate.
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An alternative interpretation of the psychic cost is that it represents the
loss of the payoff from a social norm to honest tax payment. Under this
interpretation it becomes natural to assume that the additional cost is gen-
erated by explicit social interaction, with the cost an increasing function of
the proportion of taxpayers who do not evade. This formulation captures the
idea that more social prestige will be lost the more out of step the taxpayer is
with the remainder of society. This approach has been developed by Davis,
Hecht, and Perkins (2003), Fortin, Lacroix, and Villeval (2007), Kim (2003),
Myles and Naylor (1996), and Traxler (2010) to show that reputation effects
can lead to multiple equilibria and epidemics of evasion.
The existence of additional costs seems essential to explain some features
of the tax evasion decision. To capture underlying attitudes towards com-
pliance, we choose to include in the model a social custom of honest tax
payment, so there is a utility gain from following the social custom. The
social custom is influenced by interaction in the social network, which em-
phasizes the importance of the links between individuals.
2.3 Occupational choice
There are two reasons why occupational choice is important in the context
of evasion. Firstly, there are differences in the possibility of concealing in-
come in different occupations. This is partly due to the operation of the
tax system. For example, the UK employs the Pay-As-You-Earn system in
which income tax is deducted directly from the salaries of employees. This
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prevents any opportunity for evasion (except in collaboration with the em-
ployer). Also, the nature of the occupation can explain whether there is a
tradition of payment in cash, and different occupations can support different
social customs (Ashby, Webley, & Haslam, 2009). It is therefore important
that the choice of occupation be built into the model. Occupational choice
is not an issue that has featured prominently in the literature on tax eva-
sion, although Cowell (1981), Isachsen and Strøm (1980) and Trandel and
Snow (1999) consider the choice between work in the regular and informal
economy.
The choice of occupation also has another aspect that is of interest from
a theoretical perspective. It is standard to assume that occupations differ in
the combination of risk and reward that they offer. For instance, employment
can be taken as the least risky occupation with all forms of self-employment
having greater risk. Individuals allocate to occupations on the basis of their
ability at that occupation and their attitude to risk. This is the basis of
the analyses of Kanbur (1981) and Black and de Meza (1997), which address
whether aggregate risk-taking is socially efficient. In particular, they are
concerned with whether an inefficiently low proportion of individuals enter
risky occupations and, if so, whether tax policy can be used to raise welfare.
Evasion has been incorporated into this model of occupational choice by
Pestieau and Possen (1981). The possibility of evasion in the risky occupation
has an interesting implication: if there is too little risk-taking without tax
evasion then the possibility of evading encourages risk-taking. In this case,
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setting policy to reduce evasion will drive risk-taking further from the social
optimum. At the same time, a more relaxed tax enforcement would serve
as an indirect subsidy and may, therefore, improve welfare. The converse
of this argument is that taxation has a variance-reducing effect on earnings
from self-employment (government engages in risk-sharing), and, therefore,
encourages self-employment. Evasion has the opposite effect and raises the
variance again. So, from this argument, policy should try to reduce evasion.
2.4 Social network
Tax evasion is an illegal act which has to be concealed from public view.
Similarly, revenue services do not normally reveal their audit strategies. To-
gether, these imply that taxpayers are not fully informed and can gain from
obtaining additional information. It seems natural to assume that informa-
tion will not be publicly traded, but will be passed between taxpayers who
are in a position of mutual trust. It is this situation that is modelled by the
social network.
The importance of social contacts is supported by empirical evidence.
There is a positive connection between the number of tax evaders known to
a taxpayer and the level of that taxpayer’s own evasion (De Juan, Lasheras, &
Mayo, 1994; Geeroms &Wilmots, 1985; Spicer & Lundstedt, 1976; Wallschutzky,
1984; Webley, Robben, & Morris, 1988). This suggests that the compliance
decision is not made in isolation by each taxpayer but is made with reference
to the norms and observed behaviour of the general society of the taxpayer.
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This social interaction is captured through the application of network the-
ory, as described in Goyal (2009) and Jackson (2004). In particular, we wish
to apply recent advances in the endogenous formation of networks (Page &
Wooders, 2009) to track change in the network over time, especially changes
produced by switches in occupational choice. There is some existing work
using networks in evasion analysis. Korobow, Johnson, and Axtell (2007)
considers agent-based simulations in a simple network. Franklin (2009) looks
at more complex networks but with a simpler model of the compliance deci-
sion. Networks have also been applied to the analysis of crime more generally
(e.g., Glaeser, Sacerdote, & Scheinkman, 1996).
The social network plays two roles. First, it transmits the social custom
from one person to another. If two non-evaders meet then the importance of
social custom of honest payment is increased for both, but if a non-evader
meets an evader then it is reduced for the non-evader and increased for the
evader. Second, the audit policy of the revenue service is not public informa-
tion. Individuals infer its policy partly from their own experience and partly
by receiving information about the experiences of others. The simulation
approach we employ can be seen as an application of agent-based modelling
(Bloomquist, 2004; Tesfatsion, 2006) with agent interaction controlled by
network structure.
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3 A Model
In this section we model the formation of attitudes and beliefs as the outcome
of social interaction, and opportunities as the outcome of occupational choice.
This is achieved by applying the theory of network formation to track the
links between taxpayers and the transmission of attitudes and beliefs, and
combining this with agent-based modelling that incorporates a behavioural
approach to describe individual choices.
There are n individuals interacting repeatedly; time is discrete. In every
period individuals choose a preferred occupation and an optimal level of eva-
sion. Each individual is characterised by a vector of parameters {w, ρ, q1, q2, z; p, χ},
where each parameter is independently distributed across taxpayers. The
first five parameters are assigned to the taxpayer at the outset of the analy-
sis and remain constant. These parameters are:
w ≡ wage in employment;
ρ ≡ coefficient of relative risk aversion;
qi ≡ probability of success in self-employed occupation i, i = 1, 2;
z ≡ payoff from the social custom.
The remaining two parameters are updated through interaction in the social
network. They are:
p ≡ perceived (subjective) probability of audit;
χ ≡ weight attached to payoff from following the social custom.
We now describe how these variables enter into the choice problem of a
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taxpayer and how the subjective probability and weight attached to social
custom are updated.
At the start of every period an individual has a choice between employ-
ment or entering one of two self-employment occupations. If employment
is chosen the wage, w, is obtained with certainty. The self-employment op-
portunities are represented as risky “projects”. Project i (i = 1, 2) has a
probability of success, qi, a pay-off of piis, if successful, and a pay-off pi
i
u if
unsuccessful, where piis > pi
i
u > 0. Note that the probability of success is
specific to an individual, whereas the payoffs are specific to the projects and,
therefore, are the same for all individuals undertaking a given project. That
is, the mean and variance of the pay-off from project i, conditional on the
realisation of qi for individual h, are given by
E
[
pii
∣∣ qih] = qihpiis + (1− qih)piiu,
V ar
(
pii
∣∣ qih) = qih (1− qih) (piis − piiu)2 .
The unconditional mean pay-off of project i is the expected value taken at
the societal level:
E
[
pii
]
= E
[
E
[
pii
∣∣ qih]] = E [qihpiis + (1− qih)piiu] = (piis − piiu)E [qi]+ piiu.
For example, if qi is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 across taxpayers,
then E [pii] = (piis + pi
i
u) /2. The unconditional variance (at the societal level)
of project i is
V ar
(
pii
)
= E
[
V ar
(
pii
∣∣ qih)]+ V ar (E [pii∣∣ qih])
=
(
piis − pi
i
u
)2
E
[
qi
]
E
[
1− qi
]
+ 2piispi
i
uV ar
(
qi
)
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Project 1 is termed riskier than project 2 in the sense that V ar (pi1) >
V ar (pi2) and E [pi1] ≥ E [pi2]. A strict inequality appears to be a more
interesting situation than a mean-preserving spread, because of the trade-off
between the mean and the variance at the societal level. This can be obtained
by imposing various conditions on the distribution of pii and qi.1 In partic-
ular, assuming pi1u < pi
2
u, pi
1
s > pi
2
s, pi
1
spi
1
u = pi
2
spi
2
u, and identical distributions
for qi, results in V ar (pi1) > V ar (pi2) and E [pi1] > E [pi2]. Such a parame-
terisation is employed further in the numerical simulations of the model. For
individual agents, however, the expected pay-offs and the variances differ,
according to their individual probabilities of success.
Both projects are riskier than employment, in the sense that for each
agent the wage in employment is certain. In the simulations we also assume
that, at the societal level, the mean gain from self-employment is larger than
the mean gain from employment, E [pi1] > E [pi2] > E [w]. This assumption
appears realistic, and it adds to the trade-off between the mean and the
variance in the pay-offs across occupations at the societal level.
It is not possible to evade tax in employment: the possibility arises only
when self-employment is chosen. In this case, the taxpayer has a belief,
p, over the probability of audit. The value of the perceived probability of
detection is updated through the experience of the taxpayer with audits and
through exchange of information when meeting other taxpayers. The choice
of occupation and the choice of evasion level involve risk. Each taxpayer has
1We are grateful to the anonymous referees for helping to clarify this point.
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a (constant) degree of relative risk aversion measured by the risk aversion
parameter, ρ. Taxpayers behave as if they maximise subjective expected
utility and, for analytical tractability, we assume throughout a CRRA form
for utility:
U (Y ) =
Y 1−ρ − 1
1− ρ
. (1)
There is a social custom that rewards honest tax payment. The payoff from
the social custom is given by z and the individual weight, or the importance,
assigned to this payoff by the taxpayer is determined by χ. Hence, compliance
generates an additional utility from the social custom of χz. At each point
in time the payoff is a fixed parameter for each taxpayer, but the weight
changes over time through interaction with other taxpayers in the network.
In employment there is no opportunity for evasion. The taxpayer obtains
a payoff given by
V0 =
[(1− τ )w]1−ρ − 1
1− ρ
+ χz,
where τ is the constant marginal tax rate. The possibility of tax evasion
makes the choice of self-employment a compound lottery: the outcome of the
project is random, as is the outcome of choosing to evade. If self-employment
occupation i is chosen the outcome piis or pi
i
u is randomly realised, with prob-
abilities qi and 1 − qi, respectively. Those in self-employment occupation i
are then audited, according to a fixed probability. If evasion is discovered
then unpaid tax is reclaimed and a fine is imposed on unpaid tax. We may
therefore define the expected payoff from the optimal choice of evasion in
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self-employment occupation i in state v, (v = s, u) as
V iv = max
Eiv∈[0,pi
i
v]
{
p
[(1− τ )piiv − fτE
i
v]
1−ρ
− 1
1− ρ
+(1− p)
[(1− τ) piiv + τpE
i
v]
1−ρ
− 1
1− ρ
+ χz1[Eiv=0]
}
,
where Eiv is the amount of evasion in state v for occupation i, and f > 1
is the fine rate. The term 1[A] is an indicator function that takes the value
one if A is true and zero otherwise: the payoff from the social custom is
obtained if there is no evasion. The expected payoff from the compound
lottery describing occupation i is then
V ie = q
iV is +
(
1− qi
)
V iu . (2)
The choice of occupation is made by comparing the utility levels from em-
ployment and from self-employment. Hence, the chosen occupation is given
by the maximum of {V0, V
1
e , V
2
e }.
A network is modelled as a set of bidirectional links. An example of a
network is illustrated in Figure 1. In this example individual 1 is linked to
individual 2; individual 2 is linked to individuals 1 and 3; individual 3 is
linked to 2 and 4; individual 4 is linked to 3.
<Figure 1 here>
Figure 1: Representation of network
A network can be described by an n × n symmetric matrix of zeros and
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ones. For example, the network shown in Figure 1 is described by matrix A:
A =

0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
 .
In matrix A the first row, representing the links of individual 1, has a single
1 in column 2; the second row, representing the links of individual 2, has 1s
in columns 1 and 3, etc. That is, the element in row i and column j of matrix
A is defined as
Aij =
{
1 if i and j are linked in the network,
0 otherwise.
In the simulation, the network is created at the outset and does not change.2
The network determines who may meet whom to exchange information. In
each period a random selection of meetings occur; this is described by a ma-
trix C of zeros and ones which is randomly selected every period. Individuals
i and j meet during a period if AijCij = 1. At a meeting of i and j there is a
probability that information is exchanged. When information is exchanged
it consists of three elements: the taxpayer’s subjective probability of audit,
whether or not the taxpayer was compliant in that period, and whether or
not the agent was audited. The probability of information exchange depends
on the occupational groups to which i and j belong; the probability is highest
when they are in like occupations. The probabilities of information exchange
occurring at a meeting are given by pij where i, j = e, 1, 2.
2Another possibility would be to have the network revised as a consequence of chosen
actions, i.e. employed and self-employed belonging to different social networks.
17
We consider two different processes for the formation of subjective beliefs.
As studies have reliably demonstrated important deviations from Bayesian
inference (e.g. Grether, 1980), we allow for non-Bayesian updating. The first
process, which is qualitatively similar to a Bayesian process, is to assume that
individuals feel marked as targets if they are audited, so that one audit is
believed likely to be followed by another. We term this the “target effect”.
In contrast, those not audited in a period believe they are less likely to be
audited in the next period. Formally, if audited in period t, an individual’s
belief about being audited in the next period is raised to the level P , otherwise
it decays. The updating rule for the subjective probability is therefore
p˜t+1 = X
i
tP +
(
1−X it
)
dpt, d ∈ [0, 1] , P ∈ [0, 1] (3)
where Xit = 1 if agent i was audited in period t and X
i
t = 0 otherwise. Thus,
the perceived probability of evasion of being detected is determined by the
individual’s own past experience and by the past experience of a randomly
met member of that individual’s social network. The process in (3) can also
be written as
p˜t+1 =
{
P ∈ [0, 1] if audited at t,
dpt, d ∈ [0, 1] otherwise.
(4)
The second process we consider captures the “bomb-crater” effect docu-
mented experimentally by Guala and Mittone (2005), Kastlunger, Kirchler,
Mittone, and Pitters (2009), Maciejovsky, Kirchler, and Schwarzenberger
(2007) and Mittone (2006). In this process, a taxpayer who has been audited
18
in one period believes that they will not be audited in the next, but the belief
slowly rises over time. The process is therefore described by
p˜t+1 =
{
0 if audited at t,
pt + δ (1− pt) , δ ∈ [0, 1] otherwise.
(5)
The choice of occupation in period t + 1 is made on the basis of the belief
p˜t+1. After occupational choice is made, if an information exchange occurs
at a meeting with another individual, the subjective probability is updated
according to the rule
pit+1 = µp˜
i
t+1 + (1− µ)
[
Xjt P +
(
1−Xjt
)
p˜jt+1
]
,
which can also be written as
pit+1 =
{
µp˜it+1 + (1− µ)P if j audited at t,
µp˜it+1 + (1− µ) p˜
j
t+1 otherwise.
Note that under the target effect p˜jt+1 = P if j was audited at t, and so
the updating rule reduces to pit+1 = µp˜
i
t+1 + (1− µ) p˜
j
t+1. However, under
the bomb-crater effect p˜jt+1 = 0 if j was audited at t, and so the updating
rule reflects an assumption that agent i’s perceived probability of audit may
rise after information exchange with agent j if i learns that j has just been
audited, even though j’s own perceived probability drops to zero.3
The importance attributed to the social custom is also determined by
interaction in the social network. Each individual is initially assigned a
random level of importance, χi0. This value is updated after each information
3We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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exchange with another taxpayer. The updating process is described by
χit+1 =
1
X(i) + 1
[
χitX(i) + 1[Ejt=0]
]
, (6)
where X(i) is the number of previous meetings for i at which information
was exchanged. Hence, χit+1 > χ
i
t if information is exchanged with an honest
taxpayer, and χit+1 < χ
i
t if information is exchanged with an evader.
4 Simulation
The network model described above is simulated to investigate the nature
of the equilibrium and the consequences of alternative updating rules on
beliefs. In this context, equilibrium is a state in which aggregate behaviour
is stationary around a steady-state level. Even in equilibrium, however, some
amount of variation always remains because of randomness in the outcome
of self-employment and the selection of taxpayers for audit.
This section summarises and discusses the most significant findings that
emerge from the simulations. Results are reported for the two methods of
updating beliefs in eqns. (4) and (5). In addition, for the target effect, we
also consider the effect of varying the probability of exchanging information.
The parameter values and the distributions for those random variables that
remain constant across the simulations are given in the Appendix. As dis-
cussed previously, we set the parameter values such that, on average, the
payoff from self-employment will exceed that from employment.4
4The value of the social custom, z, is measured in units of utility. Therefore, although
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4.1 Target effect
In the case of the target effect the subjective probability is increased after an
audit and decays when no auditing occurs. Two set of results are given for
this process of belief formation, which differ in the probability of information
exchange between different groups. Both sets of results are based on a true
audit probability of 0.05 and a rate of decay in belief of d = 0.75
The first set of results emphasizes the differences that can emerge be-
tween groups by assuming that, when two taxpayers in the same occupation
meet, information is exchanged always, but when two taxpayers in differ-
ent occupations meet no information is exchanged. This is termed focussed
information exchange.
The results are summarised in Figure 2. The simulation is run for 200
periods. It can be seen that the effect of the initial random assignment
of values to the subjective probability and the honesty weight is negligible
after about 20 periods. The proportions of the population in employment,
risky self-employment, and less risky self-employment are 30 per cent, 20 per
cent, and 50 per cent, respectively. The level of compliance — measured by
the proportion of agents declaring true income — is lowest for occupation 1
(about 24 per cent), which is the riskier of the two forms of self-employment.
Occupation 2 has a rate of compliance of about 53 per cent, about twice
z appears constrained to take very small values, these values are comensurate with the
values taken by the utility function in equation (1). Thus, with given parameterisation, a
true report increases the utility of an “average” individual by about 10 per cent.
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that of occupation 1. The remaining three figures explain the source of this
difference. What is interesting is that the difference in compliance between
occupations does not come from the subjective probability. The average
belief of taxpayers in both occupations is approximately 0.15. This is much
higher than the true probability of 0.05, but does not explain the different
compliance rates. The employed learn about audits only from self-employed
who have been audited and switched into employment as a result. Hence, the
subjective probability of the employed decays, on average, to just below the
true value. The second driver of the difference in compliance is the weight
given to the social custom. This is significantly lower in occupation 1 than
in occupation 2, and close to 1 among the employed. The social custom
reinforces the separation by risk aversion, and these jointly determine the
compliance outcome.
The network effects can be seen to endogenously generate a culture of
non-compliance that varies across groups. The non-compliance is not driven
by differences in beliefs but by self-selection into occupations according to risk
aversion, and is reinforced by the emergence of distinct group-specific social
customs. This illustrates the process of endogenous behavioural differences
among population sub-groups.
<Figure 2 here>
Figure 2: Focussed information exchange
(pee = 1; pe1 = 0; pe2 = 0; p11 = 1; p22 = 1; p12 = 0)
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The second set of results report the outcome with diffused information
transmission. In this case there is a positive probability (0.15) that a meeting
between taxpayers in dissimilar occupations results in information exchange.
In addition, the probability of information exchange at meetings between
members of the same occupation is reduced (compared to the results in fig-
ure 2) to 0.75. Figure 3 shows the effect that this has upon the outcome
of the simulation. Compared to Figure 2 there is very little change in the
rate of compliance (but it is slightly higher for self-employed occupation 1),
the separation by risk aversion, or the levels of the subjective probability.
The only significant difference between the two set of results is seen in the
weight attached to the social custom. The diffused information transmission
means that some employed taxpayers exchange information with evaders,
and evaders in the self-employed occupations have an increased probability
of meeting a compliant taxpayer. As a consequence, the social custom weight
among the employed is reduced, while among occupation 1 it is increased.
This enhanced importance of the social custom in occupation 1 explains the
slightly higher compliance level of that group. The proportion of the popula-
tion belonging to each occupational group remains approximately unchanged.
<Figure 3 here>
Figure 3: Diffused information exchange
(pee = 0.75; pe1 = 0.15; pe2 = 0.15; p11 = 0.75; p22 = 0.75; p12 = 0.75)
The central message of these results is that sub-groups of the population
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can endogenously form different attitudes to compliance. These differing
attitudes combine with self-selection into occupations to produce significantly
differing levels of compliance across occupations. The social network also
results in the subjective probability of audit being above the true value for
the self-employed. The self-employed groups hold similar beliefs, which are
distinctly different from those of the employed. These features highlight the
importance of social networking effects in explaining patterns of compliance.
4.2 Bomb-crater effect
The final set of results explore the outcome when the probability of audit is
updated according to the bomb-crater process. In this case the probability
is revised down after an audit, but then tends upward until the next audit
occurs. The results reported in Figure 4 are for diffused information trans-
mission. The true audit probability is again chosen to be 0.05 and the rate
of increase in belief is δ = 0.05.
The bomb-crater effect leads to a much higher level of compliance across
occupations than the target effect. For the same values of the parameters
in the simulations, about 86 per cent of taxpayers in the risky occupation
and about 92 per cent in the less risky occupation report their true income.
This high rate of compliance is a consequence of the infrequent audits. The
infrequency of audits means that there are numerous periods in which a tax-
payer is not audited and in each of these periods the subjective probability
increases. This effect is especially marked for a taxpayer who always chooses
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to be employed: no audit is ever undertaken so the subjective belief increases
toward unity. This may seem inconsistent, but, owing to the impossibility
of non-compliance in employment, an interpretation of the effect is that em-
ployed taxpayers behave “as if” p is unity.5
The occupational groups are still characterised by differing degrees of risk
aversion, but for this simulation there is little to separate the employed and
those in the less risky self-employment occupation. The major distinction
between the bomb-crater effect and the target effect is that the weights at-
tached to the social custom are fairly similar across occupations: the pattern
is the same as under the target effect, in that for the individuals in risky
occupation the weight, on average, is the lowest, and for the individuals in
employment the weight, on average, is the highest, but the differences be-
tween groups are very small. The proportions of population in employment,
risky self-employment and less risky self-employment are 36.1 per cent, 18.6
per cent, and 45.3 per cent, respectively. Comparison with the target effect
scenario shows that under the bomb-crater effect more agents choose employ-
ment (the size of this group is larger by 20 per cent), and fewer agents choose
self-employment (the size of the group in the risky occupation is lower by 7
per cent, and in the less risky occupation it is lower by 9.4 per cent). This is
consistent with the overall higher compliance rates across groups and higher
subjective probability of audit, which makes self-employment less attractive
from the viewpoint of the opportunity to evade tax.
5We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this interpretation.
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<Figure 4 here>
Figure 4: Bomb crater process for subjective probability
(pee = 0.75; pe1 = 0.15; pe2 = 0.15; p11 = 0.75; p22 = 0.75; p12 = 0.75)
4.3 Summary statistics
A summary of the descriptive statistics for the variables in Figs. 2—4 is
given in Table 1. The means and the standard deviations are calculated
over the last 50 simulated periods. Table 2 shows the averages over oc-
cupational groups for the wage in employment and probabilities of success
in self-employment, as well as the mean and the standard deviation of the
pay-offs in self-employment.
One can clearly see the outcome of the self-selection process, in particu-
lar, for the distribution of earnings. For individuals who choose employment
the probability of success in either self-employment occupation is below av-
erage, whereas their wage in employment is significantly above average. At
the same time, for individuals in self-employed occupation 1 the probability
of success in occupation 1 is above average, and the probability of success
in occupation 2 is below average; the converse holds for individuals in self-
employed occupation 2. The wage in employment is below the average pay-off
to both self-employment occupations. Individuals who self-select in occupa-
tion 1 earn, on average, a higher payoff but with a higher variance than they
would in occupation 2. At the same time, individuals who self-select in oc-
cupation 2 earn, on average, a higher payoff with a lower variance than they
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Target effect Bomb-crater effect
Focussed exchange Diffused exchange Diffused exchange
SE1 SE2 EM SE1 SE2 EM SE1 SE2 EM
Risk 2.665 5.325 6.092 2.913 5.195 6.205 2.940 5.438 5.529
aversion (.034) (.016) (.050) (.027) (.020) (.053) (.009) (.001) (.000)
Honesty .293 .722 .966 .506 .689 .818 .939 .940 .972
weight (.006) (.001) (.004) (.003) (.001) (.002) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Compliance .240 .533 1 .322 .532 1 .864 .920 1
(.026) (.014) − (.020) (.015) − (.026) (.012) −
Beliefs .150 .155 .030 .158 .155 .038 .616 .612 .940
(.022) (.010) (.004) (.015) (.010) (.006) (.015) (.015) (.002)
Table 1: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) by occupational
group
would in occupation 1. This is consistent with self-selection of individuals
with lower risk aversion into occupation 1.
5 Conclusions
An understanding of the individual tax compliance decision is important for
revenue services. Their aim is to design policy instruments to reduce the tax
gap (the difference between anticipated and actual tax revenue). Empirical
evidence demonstrates that a wide range of factors, including social groupings
and network effects, may impact upon the individual compliance decision.
The research we report in this paper combines ideas from behavioural
economics and social networks to model occupational choice and tax compli-
ance in an integrated framework. The analysis is based on the consequence
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Target effect Bomb-crater effect
Pr success Exp pay-off StDev Pr success Exp pay-off StDev
SE1
Project 1 0.819 14.192 3.849 0.824 14.247 3.802
Project 2 0.400 9.602 1.960 0.437 9.746 1.984
Employment 6.748 6.049
SE2
Project 1 0.410 10.106 4.920 0.416 10.159 4.929
Project 2 0.575 10.298 1.978 0.578 10.311 1.976
Employment 5.148 4.751
EM
Project 1 0.473 10.728 4.993 0.473 10.729 4.993
Project 2 0.472 9.886 1.997 0.467 9.869 1.996
Employment 13.046 12.586
Table 2: Success probabilities and pay-offs by groups
of taxpayers possessing social connections through which information and
attitudes relevant to the compliance decision are transmitted. The model
accommodates differences in preferences, in productivity, and in opportuni-
ties for evasion. Occupational choice operates as a form of self-selection that
places those who will evade into situations where evasion is possible. Social
interaction results in the subjective probability of audit differing from the
objective probability. Combined with a social custom that rewards compli-
ance, this can generate relatively high levels of compliance (when compared
to the “standard” model).
The simulations have considered two different processes for the formation
of subjective beliefs. These are distinguished by whether an audit causes
an increase in the subjective probability (the target effect) or a reduction
(the bomb-crater effect). Although these processes are very different, the
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important qualitative properties of the simulations are the same in both
cases. First, taxpayers self-select into occupations according to the degree
of risk aversion. Second, the subjective probability of audit can be sustained
above the objective probability. Third, the weight attached to the social
custom differs across occupations, a finding relevant to the literature on the
evolution of social norms (Bendor, 2001; Boyd and Richerson, 1994). Finally,
these factors combine to lead to a compliance level that is lower in the riskier
occupation.
The model has also demonstrated how it is possible for attitudes and be-
liefs to emerge endogenously that differ across sub-groups of the population.
The population is heterogenous in characteristics and chooses occupational
groups on the basis of characteristics. The behaviour is different across occu-
pational groups, and this is reinforced by the development of group-specific
attitudes and beliefs.
A prominent avenue for future work is to relax the assumption of random
auditing. This would allow for an analysis of the effectiveness of alternative
audit strategies when taxpayers form beliefs about auditing from interaction
in a social network.
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Appendix
Parameter values
Tax rate: τ = 0.25
Fine rate: f = 1.5
Payoffs in occupation 1: pi1s = 16; pi
1
u = 6
Payoffs in occupation 2: pi2s = 12; pi
2
u = 8
Weight in information exchange: µ = 0.75
Probability distributions
Wage in employment: w ∼ U [0, 16]
Risk aversion: ρ ∼ U [0, 10]
Success in occupation i: qi ∼ U [0, 1]
Initial belief on audit probability: p0 ∼ U [0, 1]
Importance assigned initially to social custom: χ0 ∼ U [0, 1]
Value of social custom: z ∼ U [0, 3× 10−5]
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